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supuestos acerca del perfil de salarios, y obtuvimos de .03 a .6 por 
ciento del PIB, dependiendo del factor de descuento utilizado. Se-
gundo, contemplamos otros tipos de violencia para estimar los costos 
sociales del crimen en la ciudad de México, los cuales ascendieron a 
3.6 por ciento del PIB de la ciudad, el cual consideramos subestima 
los verdaderos costos. Contar con información sobre no víctimas sería 
muy valioso para continuar investigando sobre el tema. 
Abstract: In this paper we measure social costs of crime, following two ap-
proaches. First, estimate costs of homicides, at the National level in 
1997, under different assumptions about lost wages. When assuming 
profiles differ over the life cycle, the costs amount from .03 to .6 per-
cent of GDP, depending on the discount factor. Second, we take into 
consideration other types of crime to estimate social costs of crime in 
Mexico City. We found costs approximate 3.6 percent of the City's 
GDP, but consider this figure a lower bound. Further data including 
costs borne by non-victims would be most helpful for further research 
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1. Introduction 
The social costs that arise from crime have been previously analyzed 
and estimated in several studies, especially in the United States (Free-
man 1996). Most of these studies suggest different methodologies for 
eliciting sound estimates of social costs and come to impressive re-
sults regarding their dimension. However, very little has been done to 
assess the distributional consequences of crime on the socio-economic 
status of the individuals. 
In this paper we first approximate one dimension of the social 
costs of crime for the country as a whole. Due to data limitations, we 
only use aggregate, officially reported homicide rates as an indicator of 
the social costs of crime. While it is true that the social costs of crime 
are composed of many factors,
1 this is only an approximation, perhaps 
a lower bound. However, to obtain a better order of magnitude of the 
social costs of crime, we use a victimization survey collected in the 
Mexico City area that is well suited for more complete indicators the 
costs individuals bear when they experience a crime. We calculate 
both monetary and non-monetary costs of crime. 
We find, first, that the social costs of crime attributed to losses 
of lives due to homicides in 1997 amounts to between .03 to .6 percent 
of Mexican GDP, when we take into consideration different wage pro-
files for the life cycle, depending on assumptions about the discount 
factor. Second, figures that do not take into account differences in 
wage profiles over time, severely underestimate the costs that can be 
attributed to homicides. Third, we find that the social costs of crime 
and crime prevention in Mexico City in 1999 approximate 6 percent of 
the City's GDP in 1998. Moreover, when the value of property trans-
fers attributable to robbery and larceny theft is taken into account, 
victimization costs rise to over 10 percent of the City's GDP. Fourth, 
we find that the impact of these costs is higher in the lowest quin-
tiles of income. Poor people in Mexico City constitute the vulnerable 
group toward which public policy should be oriented. 
2. Review of the Literature on Crime 
The economic literature on the subject of crime and violence can be 
traced back to the late sixties, when Becker (1968) first addressed, 
1 Buvinic, Morrison and Shifter (1999) categorize the social costs that can 
be attributed to crime into direct costs, non-monetary costs, economic multiplier 
effect and social multiplier effects. THE SOCIAL COSTS OF CRIME IN MEXICO  5 
from a theoretical approach, the question of what leads individuals 
to choose to perform criminal activities over "lawful" ones. Follow-
ing Becker's contribution, most of the economic literature regarding 
crime and violence has focused on the determinants of crime and their 
relationship with economic variables. This literature is especially rich 
in studies for the United States. According to these studies, the most 
important economic determinant of changes over time in the crime 
rate seems to be changes in labor market conditions, including the 
evolution of wages, unemployment, and also changes in income in-
equality. These seem to affect, substantially, the benefits relative to 
costs of undertaking criminal activities. 
Some of the most recent research is that of Mocan and Rees 
(1999), who find that both an increase in local unemployment and 
local poverty increase the propensity of juveniles to commit crimes. 
Likewise, Grogger (1997) finds that youths are particularly responsive 
to price incentives, which suggests that reductions in real wages are 
an important explanation of the observed increase in youth crime. In 
additional, Witte and Tauchen (1994) encounter that schooling and 
work significantly decrease the probability of committing criminal 
acts in a cohort sample of young men. Freeman (1994, 1996) suggests 
that an increase in income inequality and particularly a decrease in 
the real earnings of the less educated can lead to increases in the 
propensity to commit crime. On the other hand, and against general 
expectations, Witt and Witte (1998) find that not only are higher 
levels of imprisonment in the United States related to significantly 
higher crime rates, but that increases in labor participation of women 
have an even stronger impact on crime than that of imprisonment. 
Fajnzylber, Lederman and Loayza (FLL, 1998) undertake an anal-
ysis of the determinants of intentional homicide rates using an unbal-
anced panel of countries. They find that the rate of growth of GDP has 
a negative and significant relationship with homicide rates, while Gini 
coefficients and dummies for drug producing countries have positive 
and significant effects on homicide rates. They also find that there 
is a positive (but weak) association between an increase in the aver-
age school years of the population and a decrease in homicide rates. 
Other studies encounter that violence is related to accelerated eco-
nomic growth, stating that poverty and inequality in the distribution 
of income are often associated with high crime rates under contexts 
of demographic changes, urbanization and industrialization (Samp-
son and Lauritsen, 1994). Regarding the differences in crime rates 
between urban and rural areas, Gleaser, Sacerdote and Scheinkman 
(1996) find that they are significantly explained by observable char-6 ESTUDIOS ECONÓMICOS 
acteristics of individuals and cities, especially by those characteristics 
that reflect tastes, social influences and family structure. 
In an earlier paper, Glaeser and Sacerdote (1995) had already 
found that the amount of social interactions in cities can explain the 
high cross-city variance of crime rates. Social interactions are high 
in petty crimes (such as larceny and auto-theft), moderate in more 
serious crimes (such as burglary and robbery) and almost nonexistent 
in homicide and rape. Lederman, Loayza and Menéndez (1999) also 
found that social capital, measured as trust in community members, 
has the effect of reducing the incidence of violent crimes. However, 
other measures of social capital had no significance when explaining 
differences in crime rates. 
Research on the causes of crime for Mexico is scarcer. Several 
books have been written on the subject of crime in Mexico and the 
considerable increase that has taken place in the last two decades. 
However, the statistical analysis employed is, generally, limited to 
aggregate nation-wide statistics, or to the increase in crime rates in 
a couple of large cities, and, within these, mostly of Mexico City. 
Related to this, an important effort has been made by the Citizen's 
Institute for the Study of Insecurity, (ICESI). During 2001 and 2002 
respectively, this organization fielded the first and second National 
Surveys of Insecurity. Results from these surveys characterize crime in 
Mexico, with respect to incidence, type of crime, reporting and value 
of losses. While Ruiz Harrel (1998) finds that changes in economic 
activity are important in explaining crime, the study by Instituto 
Mexicano de Estudios de la Criminalidad Organizada, IMECO (1998), 
argues that other factors, such as drug dealing, are more important. 
More recently, Messmacher (2000) finds, through a very similar 
approach to that used by FLL (1998), that the 1995 crisis in Mexico 
had a strong effect on the increase of homicide rates. According to 
Messmacher's study, an increase in the rate of growth of employment 
has a negative effect on the homicide rate, even larger than that of an 
increase in the growth of GDP, suggesting that the effect of the crisis 
on homicides acted through events in labor markets. 
The consequences of crime and violence in terms of social costs 
have definitely received less attention by such a large literature. The 
consequences of crime are, however, as important as its causes if one 
wants to understand the crime phenomenon well enough to design 
public policies aimed at its reduction. Violence and crime cause seri-
ous monetary and non-monetary losses to individuals and societies in 
general. There is general agreement that monetary costs refer to those 
of controlling criminality -a cost that is usually born by the whole so-THE SOCIAL COSTS OF CRIME IN MEXICO  7 
ciety, through governmental expenditure; spending on self-protection; 
and the costs of recovering from the losses, as well as opportunity costs 
of time, and medical expenses. Non-monetary costs are generally at-
tributed to the social costs of losing lives to homicides, as well as to 
the costs associated with losses in the quality of life, such as the costs 
of pain and fear and those associated with behavioral changes before 
or after being a victim of crime. Monetary and non-monetary costs 
of crime and violence are difficult to estimate for the vast majority of 
countries. Especially in Mexico and other Latin American countries, 
official crime data are often scarce and, when they exist, not always 
reliable (Mexican Health Foundation (FUNSALUD) and World Bank, 
1999). 
The literature for the United States has only recently addressed 
this issue. Miller, Cohen and Rossman (1993) calculate the monetary 
costs of crime (medical bills, property loss and lost productivity) and 
reductions in the quality of life attributable to pain and suffering. 
They calculate jury awards in civil suits, excluding punitive damage, 
for a wide range of crime categories. According to their estimates, the 
cost per murder in 1993 was over $2.7 million, of which $700,000 was 
for lost productivity.
2 In 1996, Cohen, Miller and Wiersema (CMW, 
1996) estimated that crime generated a total loss of $450 billion an-
nually. This estimation included property and productivity losses, 
outlays for medical expenses, values of pain, long-term emotional 
trauma, disability and the risk of death. However, the confidence 
intervals of most of their estimates are so large that the estimates are 
statistically insignificant.
3 More recently, Bourguignon (1998), based 
on Freeman (1996), calculated that the cost of crime in the US in 1995 
was equivalent to 3.7% of that year's GDP. 
In Latin America, the study by the ICESI (2002) on violence in 
Mexico estimated the costs attributable to crime and found that, on 
average, these losses are equal to $13,245 pesos per victim in 2001, or 
0.85 percent of GDP in sum. Unfortunately the methodology used to 
arrive to this estimate is not provided. 
Londono and Guerrero (LG, 1999) estimate that the total costs of 
violence in Latin America sum up to 14.2% of the region's GDP. This 
2 The Miller, Cohen, and Rossman (1993) estimates are available for murder, 
rape, robbery and assault only. The costs of additional preventive measures taken 
by victims, lifestyle changes associated with the marginal crime or legal costs are 
not estimated. Therefore the results may understate the true costs of crime in 
1993. 
3 The confidence intervals for the Cohen, Miller and Wiersema (1996) estimate 
that the total costs of crime are between $175 billion- $27 trillion. 8 ESTUDIOS ECONÓMICOS 
estimation includes the costs of lives lost to homicide, medical care for 
victims, public and private security measures, justice procedures, and 
the decrease in investment and production due to violence. According 
to this study, in 1996 the cost of crime in Mexico reached 12.3% of its 
GDP.
4 It should be mentioned that the value of property taken in case 
of theft (which is in fact a transfer of property from one individual to 
another and not a social cost) is taken into account in this estimation. 
The Mexican Health Foundation (1998) estimated that in 1995 the 
costs of violence in Mexico City alone attained 42.4% of the city's 
GDP. Again, 10% of these costs are due to property transfers during 
theft, but nevertheless, the percentage is certainly impressive.
5 
However, both LG (1999) and FUNSALUD (1998) calculate the 
cost attributable to the loss of lives due to homicide assuming that 
all victims earned the average wage of the population as a whole. 
Their results can then only be accurate if we assume that the income 
distribution is the same for victims as it is for the general population. 
In other words, if victims have a lower or higher income distribution 
than that of the general population, attributing the average wage to 
any lost life might introduce an upward or downward bias in their 
calculations. The same applies for the age and sex distributions. In 
studies regarding the costs of crime in the United States this type 
of bias is not uncommon. For example, the costs estimated by CMW 
(1996) most probably suffer from a major upward bias due to the use 
of average incomes. This problem is especially serious in countries like 
Mexico, where homicide victims tend to be poor young males (FUN-
SALUD and World Bank, 1999). Moreover, LG (1999) and FUNSALUD 
(1998) do not take into account that the lost lives of individuals in 
terms of productivity would have changed over the life course. We 
address both of these issues in this study. 
3. Methodology 
To estimate the social cost of crime is not an easy task for one re-
quires not only very detailed information about monetary losses at 
the individual level of victims, but also information about the emo-
tional costs experienced. In this study we attempt to measure a part 
4 This estimate includes the cost associated with lost health, lost lives, mate-
rial losses, productivity, and investment losses, losses on labor and consumption 
and property transfers. 
5 FUNSALUD (1998) include in their estimates all of the LG (1999) costs in 
addition to public expenditures on national security and justice THE SOCIAL COSTS OF CRIME IN MEXICO  9 
of social costs of crime in two ways. The first one relates to costs 
of crimes calculated using aggregate data, more specifically, homicide 
rates. The second one refers to costs of crime born by individuals as 
they report. This information is available in victimization surveys, 
and can be used to have closer order of magnitudes of the costs of 
crime. In addition, this information is well suited to provide insights 
into how these costs are distributed across socio-economic status. Fol-
lowing we describe each method along with the data employed. 
3.1. Aggregate Data 
We use official databases on homicides of the National Institute of 
Statistics (INEGI, 1997). These data include information about each 
reported death in the whole country in addition to providing some 
socio-economic and demographic characteristics of the deceased. The 
advantage of homicide rates on any other crime variable is that homi-
cides have a great propensity to be reported, not likewise other types 
of crime. Most homicides are reported and recorded by the police, the 
forensic service and the general prosecutors' office. Unfortunately, in 
the case other crimes, such as robbery or even sexual assault (Frenk, 
1997), the report rate generally underestimates the real crime rate. 
We will follow a simple economic approach in assessing the value 
of the life lost, acknowledging that the measure we obtain is a lower 
bound of the real social costs of crime to society, which would include, 
not only a crude estimation of labor productivity lost, but also emo-
tional and psychological burdens, a value for human capital losses, 
and values of decreases in productivity, among the most important. 
We use information on homicide rates and impute a value of labor 
productivity lost of each individual deceased. For this purpose we use 
three different approaches: 
3.1.1. Number of Years Lost 
We calculate the number of years lost per individual by subtracting 
age from the number of years of life expectancy and attribute to them 
the last annual salary earned by an individual. To obtain the cost of 
crime we sum these figures over all individuals. 
3.1.2. Measure of Labor Productivity Lost 
We calculate the number of years that each individual would have 
been labor productive had he not died. Assuming that his/her wage 10 ESTUDIOS ECONÓMICOS 
would have remained constant over his life cycle, we then discount to 
the year of his/ her death the value of the stream of wages he would 
have earned until he reached 65 (retirement age). For the discount 
factors we assume three different rates: 5%, 7% and 10%. 
3.1.3. Measure of Labor Productivity Lost, Adjusted for Changes in 
Wage Profiles 
We calculate the number of years that each individual would have 
been labor productive had he not died. Assuming that his/her wage 
would have changed over the life cycle, and using wage profiles by co-
horts of individuals we discount to the year of his/her death the value 
of the stream of wages he would have earned until he reached 65. To 
calculate the wage profiles we take into consideration age, education, 
gender, sector of residence and occupation. For the discount factors 
we assume three different rates: 5%, 7% and 10%. 
3.2. Individual Data 
The costs that emerge from crime and violence are more than just 
those that can be attributable to the loss of lives. Unfortunately, 
as was mentioned before, there are no reliable official data bases on 
types of crimes other than homicides. However, there is a victimiza-
tion survey for Mexico City that collects information about different 
types of crimes suffered by individuals and out of pocket expenditures 
related with crime prevention and crime consequences. The advan-
tage of using this survey instead of official data on crime is that we 
avoid the problem that arises from under-reporting. In this paper, 
we analyze the distribution of the costs of crime borne by the vic-
tims of crime by per capita expenditure quintile in Mexico City. Per 
capita expenditure quintiles were constructed using the information 
on monthly family expenditure provided by the victims in the survey 
and dividing it by the number of household members in the victim's 
household (also provided by the survey). 
We divided costs into monetary and non-monetary costs. Mone-
tary costs include: 1) direct costs, which comprise the cost of medical 
care when needed, the cost of the legal procedures that took place 
while reporting or following the report of the crime, the cost of differ-
ent safety measures that individuals purchased after being victims of 
crime, and 2) indirect costs, which consist of the cost of the days lost THE SOCIAL COSTS OF CRIME IN MEXICO 11 
to seeking medical care and/or to bad health after being a victim as 
well as the cost of the days spent in legal procedures. 
All direct costs were directly reported by the victims as out of 
pocket expenses, except for the cost of medical care for those victims 
who sought care at public health care institutions,
6 in which case 
the cost of care is estimated using official average costs of different 
health care interventions provided by a representative public hospital 
in Mexico City. Indirect costs were calculated by multiplying the 
number of days lost to seeking medical care or recovering their health 
and those spent in legal procedures (all reported by the victims) by 
the daily per capita expenditure of the victims (also reported by the 
victims). It should be noted that this calculation only provides a lower 
bound of the real costs for two main reasons. First, due to the absence 
of income information in the survey, we do not attribute lost income 
but lost expenditure to the days that were lost, and expenditure is 
usually lower than income. Second, we are not including the costs of 
physical or emotional pain and/or stress in this calculation. 
Non-monetary costs include the cost of fear (measured through 
the willingness to pay of individuals not to feel fear after being victims 
of crime), the opportunity costs of not increasing public safety mea-
sures (estimated through the willingness to pay of victims to increase 
public safety measures) and the willingness to pay to recover the life 
style they had before the crime. The latter measures in an indirect 
way the cost of behavioral changes of the victims, such as avoiding 
leaving home at night, stop working late hours, avoid wearing jewelry, 
avoid taking public transportation and the like. 
It is important to note that all our calculations refer to the costs 
borne by the victims of crime, given that all information regarding 
costs was not collected for non-victims in this survey. For this reason, 
our final estimates regarding the magnitude of the costs will most 
likely be downward biased. 
4. Data 
To estimate the social costs of crime at the aggregate level, we use 
official data bases on homicides for 1997 of the National Institute 
of Statistics (INEGI, 1997), and on labor income from the Income-
Expenditure Surveys also collected by INEGI. 
6 In Mexico public health care is provided by the Mexican Ministry of Health 
at no cost for the patients 12 ESTUDIOS ECONÓMICOS 
The data on homicides contains information about the gender of 
the deceased individuals, educational attainment, sector of residence 
(county), occupation, and age. The total number of observations is 
13,287. 
In addition, we use information from the third quarter of the 
Encuesta Nacional de Ingreso-Gasto de los Hogares, ENIGH, a con-
sumer expenditure survey collected from August to November 1996 
by the INEGI.
7 The sample size is 12,815 households and is nation-
ally representative when properly weighted with the inflation factors. 
This survey has information on personal characteristics of the house-
hold members,
8 total household and individual labor and non-labor 
income, household monetary expenditures (commodities that were ac-
tually purchased), household non-monetary expenditures (commodi-
ties received or paid as in-kind, gifts and auto-consumption), and 
dwelling characteristics. 
We make use of the Income-Expenditure Surveys to calculate 
mean wages of cohorts of people defined by age, education, gender, 
sector of residence and occupational categories and cross them with 
the homicides' data. Given that our main interest is to estimate labor 
wage profiles, only the information regarding individual labor income 
was used. The data provided by ENIGH correspond to the wages 
received in the six months prior to the collection of the survey. 
To estimate the social costs of crime at the individual level we 
use a victimization survey, carried out by the World Bank and FUN-
SALUD in 1999 (WBF). This survey is representative of the victims of 
crime in Mexico City and is particularly interesting and well suited 
for the study of social costs of crime in that is contains a wealth of 
information that range from monetary costs born by victims as well 
as questions related to emotional impacts posed in a willingness to 
pay approach. In addition, it contains some demographic and socio-
economic characteristics of victims, which can be used to assess how 
crime is distributed across selected groups of individuals. Unfortu-
nately, as was stated before, the survey collects information only on 
monthly family expenditure but not family income. Therefore, all dis-
tributions of costs calculated in this study are related to the family 
expenditure level. 
For the collection of the WBF a representative sample of 2,605 
7 For comparability reasons, exclusively the data pertaining to the third quar-
ter of each year is used in this study. 
8 For each member, age, education, sex, relation to the head and labor force 
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households was randomly selected.
9 In each household the first person 
who answered the door was asked whether he or she had been a victim 
of any type of crime in the past six months. When the answer was 
positive the person was interviewed. In total, 993 individuals were 
found to have been victims of a crime in the six months prior to the 
interview, while the rest (1,612 individuals) had not been victims of 
any type of crime. Therefore, the complete survey was answered by 




 The survey provides no information about the 
remaining 1,014 non-victims. In this study we only take into account 
the information related to the victims, and therefore we work with 
a sub-sample of 993 individuals. Table 1 shows several interesting 
frequencies regarding the victims of crime. 
Table 1 
Frequencies Regarding the Victims of Crime 
All victims (n = 993)  Percentage 
Gender 
Male  56 
Female  44 
Number of household members victimized in past 6 months* 
1 (respondent only)  78 
2 (including respondent)  15 
3 (including respondent)  4 
whole family  3 
Number of crimes suffered in past 6 months (by respondent) 
1  86 
2  11 
3+  3 
9 For detailed information about sampling and survey methodology, please 
refer to: FUNSALUD and World Bank, 1999. 
1
0
 The only information collected regarding these non-victims was their county 
of residence, the number of household members in their household, the monthly 
family income and their perception of crime in the county. No information was 
collected at the individual level. 14 ESTUDIOS ECONÓMICOS 
Table 1 
(continued 
All victims (n = 993)  Percentage 
Type of crime** 
Larceny theft  62 
Robbery  32 
Physical aggression  5 
Sexual assault/kidnapping  1 
Age 
Under 20  13 
20 - 30  32 
31 - 40  31 
41 - 50  14 
51 - 60  5 
61 +  5 
Place of crime 
Victim's neighborhood  43 
Street  26 
Public transportation  23 
Work place/ school  3 
Bars/nightclubs  3 
Banks  2 
No. of household members who contribute to family expenditure 
1  49 
2  30 
3+  21 
•The survey collected information only about the respondent, but 
did not collect information about the crimes suffered by members of the 
respondent's household who had also been victimized. 
**The survey includes five possible categories of crime: larceny theft 
(denned as theft without violence), robbery (defined as violent theft), phys-
ical aggression (without theft), sexual assault and kidnapping. Percentages 
refer to the last type of crime suffered by the respondent. THE SOCIAL COSTS OF CRIME IN MEXICO 15 
Regarding the socioeconomic characteristics of the interviewed, 
the average family monthly expenditure was $2,404 pesos (approxi-
mately USD$ 240) and the median was $3,302 pesos (approximately 
USD$330). The average number of household members in each house-
hold was 5. 
5. Costs of Crime 
5.1. The Level of Homicide Rates Across Mexican States 
As can be seen from figure 1, the homicide rate at the national level 
has decreased over the last decade. These changes have not been 
equally distributed across states, and the distribution has changed 
somewhat over time, with a relative increase in the homicide incidence 
in Mexico City and states in the North West of Mexico. According 
to Messmacher (2000) there is some absolute convergence during the 
period 1979-1997 in homicide rates across states, which has taken 
place by a reduction of homicide rates in high homicide states and 
an increase in homicides in low homicide states. Table 2 reports de-
scriptive statistics of the homicide data by quintiles of labor income 
in 1997. It is interesting to note that it is the lowest quintiles that 
exhibit a higher proportion of deceased women relative to the rest. 
This suggests that poor women are relatively more vulnerable. An-
other interesting fact is that younger individuals are killed in lower 
quintiles as opposed to older in upper ones. 
Table 3 presents the results for the estimated costs of homicides 
under the three different alternatives. Column 1 refers to the es-
timated costs taking into consideration differences in wage profiles 
for three different assumptions with respect to the discount factor 
(r=0.05, r=0.07 and r=0.10). Column 2 refers to the costs assuming 
a constant wage over the life cycle, while the last column presents the 
results relating a number of years lost due to the homicide. It can 
be noted that the highest costs are obtained when taking into con-
sideration that wages of the deceased individuals would have grown 
over time for young people and decreased for older ones. These costs 
are of serious magnitude. To make a sizable comparison, table 4 in-
cludes the costs as a proportion of GDP. It should be emphasized that 
methodologies that only include the number of years lost severely 
underestimate the costs of homicides. 16 ESTUDIOS ECONÓMICOS 
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5.2. The Costs of Crime in Mexico City 
To assess how crime is distributed across socio-economic groups, we 
use the WBF survey to construct five per capita expenditure groups 
based on the monthly expenditure reported by the victims. Hereafter 
we will refer to these expenditure groups as quintiles, being the first 
quintile (quintile 1) the one that assembles those individuals that fall 
into the first 20% of the per capita expenditure distribution and the 
last quintile (quintile 5) the one where individuals with a monthly per 
capita expenditure above the 80% of the distribution are grouped. 
5.2.1. Monetary Costs of Crime by Expenditure Quintile 
5.2.1.1. Costs of Medical Care 
According to the WBF survey, 23% of the victims suffered injuries 
as a consequence to robbery or physical aggression, most of which 
were produced by blows with hands or feet (63%), 18% by knives, 
14% by firearms and 9% by some other type of object (chains, tools, 
etc.). Slightly more than half (51.6%) of the injured victims received 
medical care. However, this percentage varies across quintiles (see 
figure 3), for most of the medical care is sought by individuals in 
medium quintiles. 
Figure 3 
Percentage of injured victims who 
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Of all injured victims who sought medical care, 21% received it in 
private health care institutions, 47% received it in Social Security In-
stitutions, 3.4% in the Ministry of Health, 11% in the City's public 
hospitals and 11% in the Red Cross. The rest received care in an 
ambulance or at their or their neighbors' home. Of the individuals 
who sought for medical care 25% paid for their treatment, and spent 
on average $1,136 pesos (approximately US$110). The percentages 
slightly vary across quintiles. Figure 4 shows the percentage of indi-
viduals within quintiles that sought for care in public/social security 
institutions and in private ones. We note that the vast majority of 
individuals across quintiles tend to seek public health care after being 
victims of crime. Private health care is mostly used by individuals 
in quintile 4. In Mexico, health care of any type is free of charge in 
public institutions. In social security institutions care is free of charge 
for individuals entitled to social security but emergency care is free 
of charge for any individual. We would therefore expect individuals 
that sought private health care to bear most of the cost of the service; 
however this is not the case. 
Figure 4 
Percentage of users of public and 







Ql Q2 Q3 Q4 Q5 
Expenditure quintile 
Private care  [] Public ca 
% THE SOCIAL COSTS OF CRIME IN MEXICO 23 
We calculated the share of the monthly per capita expenditure that 
the medical expenses represented for each quintile. The results are 
astonishing in terms of the inequality in the distribution of the shares. 
The medical costs for individuals in quintile 1 reach, on average, 720% 
of their monthly per capita expenditure. The average share decreases 
as expenditure level increases. However, it is those individuals in 
quintile 3 who paid the smallest proportion (45%) of their monthly 
expenditure in medical expenditures. Therefore, even if individuals 
from low quintiles seek less medical care, the monetary amount paid 
for private care (or social security in case of not being entitled to it 
or not being considered an emergency) by these individuals is much 
higher in relative terms than that paid by individuals in other quin-
tiles. In total, medical expenditures reached 25,000 pesos (US$2,660). 
Figure 5 depicts the average cost of medical care by expenditure quin-
tile. 
Figure 5 
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Injured individuals lost, on average, 6.9 work or school days after the 
crime. In total, 756 productive days were lost. The percentage of 
individuals who lost one or more days because of medical care and/or 24 ESTUDIOS ECONÓMICOS 
bad health increases from quintile 1 to quintile 4 and decreases again 
for individuals in quintile 5 (see figure 6). The total cost of the days 
lost to medical care and/or bad health after the crime amounts 30,264 
pesos (US$ 3,220) for the victims of this survey. As for the shares of 
the cost of the days (relative to expenditures) that were lost to medical 
care and/or bad health, we note that individuals in quintile 4 bear 
the highest share (see figure 7). 
Figure 6 
Percentage of victims who lost/did not lose 
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The most frequent injuries that the victims suffered were contu-
sions or physical traumas (84%) and superficial wounds (14%). The 
rest suffered from deep wounds or cranial contusions. We estimated 
the social cost of the medical care of those victims who did receive 
care but did not pay for it by multiplying the number of injuries (by 
type) by the average cost of medical care by type of injury in public 
hospitals in Mexico City.
1
1
 The total cost for treatment of the in-
li  The costs were provided by Hospital Balbuena, a public hospital in Mexico 
City. Unfortunately, it is the only hospital for which average costs of interven-
tions were available for every type of injury that was reported by the victims of 
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juries that were taken care of by public or social security institutions 
was 1,861,918 pesos (US$198,076). 
Figure 7 
Average cost of days lost to medical care and/or bad 
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5.2.1.2. Cost of Legal Procedures 
In the survey, victims were asked if they had to undergo any type 
of legal procedure related to the crime. Legal procedures embrace 
all legal actions that were taken after the crime, from reporting it to 
the police to hiring a lawyer. Even the costs of some illegal actions, 
such as bribing the legal system workers in order to facilitate the 
investigation or to have their case followed up are taken into account. 
In Mexico, the legal process to report any type of crime is free of 
charge to the public. However, the cases in which the victims had to 
bribe the police or to hire a private lawyer obviously represented an 
out of pocket expenditure for the victims. It should be noted that in 
the survey. The costs of care are usually homogeneous across public hospitals, 
however, they may vary in social security and Red Cross hospitals, and therefore 
our estimate should be interpreted with care. 26 ESTUDIOS ECONÓMICOS 
the following calculations we do not include the costs that the legal 
procedures represent to the public legal system of the city. We only 
take into account the out of pocket expenditures that were borne by 
the victims. 
The crime-reporting rate was 17%. The reporting rate varied 
according to the type of crime. Only 15% of the victims of larceny 
reported the crime, whereas 21% of the victims of robbery reported it. 
The reporting rate also depended on the age of the victim. Indeed, the 
rate increases with age: 18% of the victims between 15 and 24 years 
reported the crime, while 22% of victims over 60 reported it. Across 
quintiles, only 12.5% of victims who belong to quintile 1 reported the 
crime, while 20.7% of those victims in the highest quintile reported it. 
The percentages for quintiles 2, 3 and 4 are 18.5%, 14.5% and 19.5% 
respectively. 
Only 16% of the victims who reported the crime had to pay for 
the legal process. By quintiles, this percentage varies. In quintile 1 
only 9% of the victims paid for the process. Quintile 2 has the highest 
percentage of victims who paid for the procedure (28%), while quin-
tiles 3, 4 and 5 have 17%, 18% and 23% of individuals, respectively, 
who paid for the legal procedure. 
Figure 8 
Average cost of legal procedure by quintile, 
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We calculated the share of the monthly per capita expenditure 
that legal procedure costs represented for individuals in each quintile. 
Figure 8 shows the distribution of the shares by quintile. Individuals 
in quintile 1 had to pay the equivalent of 74% of their monthly total 
outlay in the legal procedures. However it is those individuals in 
quintiles 2 and 3 who pay the highest proportions: 390% and 394% 
of their monthly expenditures respectively. The proportion decreases 
again for individuals in quintiles 4 and 5. 
The legal process is time consuming. On average, each person 
who reported a crime invested 6.35 days in the legal process. By quin-
tile, individuals in quintile 1 invested more than 8 days on average on 
legal procedures. The average number of days lost to legal procedures 
by quintile is shown in figure 9. The cost of these lost productive days 
relative to monthly expenditure by quintile is shown in figure 10. As 
we can see, even if individuals in quintile 2 spent the lowest number 
of days, on average, in legal procedures, they bear the highest share 
relative to their income. 
Figure 9 
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Figure 10 
Average cost of days lost to legal procedure 
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5.2.1.3. Cost of Safety Measures 
Individuals were asked about their expenses on different personal 
safety measures that might have been purchased after the crime. 
Safety measures included firearms, knives, mace or pepper spray, 
alarms or security locks for their houses, life insurance, personal asset 
insurance, installing some private security system in their neighbor-
hood, renting a parking lot for their cars and hiring personal security. 
Only 8.9% of the victims spent on some of the above safety mea-
sures. Of those victims who paid for security measures, 46% bought 
alarms or safety locks for their homes, 22% bought a firearm, 18% 
rented a parking lot for their car, 4% bought pepper spray 2.8% 
bought knives, 2.7% bought personal asset insurance, 2.7% installed 
a private security system in their neighborhood and 1.3% hired per-
sonal security. The individual costs of these measures vary between 
60 and 5,000 pesos (US$6.4 to US$532), with a mean of 1,038 pesos 
(US$110). The total cost amounted 35,300 pesos (US$3,755). By ex-
penditure quintile, we find that for individuals in quintiles 1, 2 and 
3 the costs of safety measures more than doubled their monthly per THE SOCIAL COSTS OF CRIME IN MEXICO 29 
capita expenditure, while individuals in quintiles 4 and 5 paid the 
equivalent to 69% and 109% of their monthly per capita expenditure 
respectively (see figure 11). 
Figure 11 
Average cost of safety measures by quintile, 
















As was mentioned in sections 3 and 4, the survey does not provide 
information on any type of cost borne by non-victims, and expenses 
on safety measures are not the exception. Therefore, the resulting 
costs of safety measures most probably understate the real costs, for 
non-victims probably also spend on safety measures. 
5.2.2. Non-Monetary Costs of Crime by Expenditure Quintiles 
Given that neither crime nor crime reduction are sold in a competi-
tive market, the best way -in accordance with the economic theory-
for economists to measure the costs that arise from crime is through 
estimating the willingness to pay (WTP) for a reduction in the fate 
of crime. One method that is commonly used to elicit measures of 
WTP is called contingent valuation (CV). In this approach, the answer 30 ESTUDIOS ECONÓMICOS 
to a valuation question is contingent upon a particular hypothetical 
market described to the respondents. Thus, the CV method collects 
information on individuals' preferences by asking them how much 
money they would be willing to pay for some change in the provision 
of a commodity. In other words, people are asked about their hypo-
thetical willingness to make a trade off between money and a change 
in a certain risk in question. In the case of crime, we are interested 
in the maximum amount of money that individuals would be willing 
to pay in order not to be exposed to violence or crime. 
As has been recognized, the main advantage of this method is 
that it is relatively simple and straightforward in practice. It is also 
a very dependable method when the proper guidelines are followed in 
the conduction of the study (Portney, 1994).
1
2
 However, CV studies 
generally suffer from several important problems. The most common 
one is to make the scenario sufficiently comprehensible, plausible and 
meaningful to respondents. Moreover, there are a number of sources 
of potential biases that might lead to a possible under or over esti-
mation of the true WTP, such as the incentives that individuals have 
to misrepresent responses and the inference biases.
1
3
 Such biases are 
generally difficult to control for. It has become standard practice in 
the CV literature to eliminate some responses as being unreasonable 
(for example, more than 5 percent of income for an environmental 
public good that contains only nonuse value). Similarly, it is stan-
dard practice to eliminate some responses of zero on the basis that 
they are "protest zeros" against the investigation or because indi-
viduals think it is not their responsibility to pay for something that 
is someone else's responsibility (Diamond and Hausman, 1994), like 
crime reduction, for example. Likewise, individuals may receive a 
"warm glow" from expressing support for good causes, or they may 
be describing what they think is good for the country in a casual 
way. Similarly, low-income people might suspect that they might be 
harmed if they report a low WTP. This is why it has been claimed 
that in CV studies it is better to ask people what percentage of their 
income they are willing to pay rather than to ask them for an absolute 
amount of money, or, as an alternative, what the government should 
u The guidelines suggested by Portney are: use personal interviews (as op-
posed to mail interviews), ask WTP for future outcomes and not for counterfac-
tual past outcomes, use close-ended questions, accurately describe the scenario, 
mention a budget constraint, mention all substitutes for the commodity and in-
clude a de-briefing at the end of the interview. 
1
3
 For an analysis of all sources of potential biases in CV studies see Johannes-
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be willing to pay (Pauly, 1995). In summary, the misrepresentation of 
responses bias implies that responses are not an attempt by an indi-
vidual to evaluate his own preference for a commodity. The only way 
of minimizing these kinds of biases is to have a sample large enough 
to make the survey as a whole useful for policy purposes. 
In the WBF survey, three CV questions were included. The survey 
asked the victims their maximum WTP not to feel fear, their maxi-
mum WTP for an increase in public safety measures and their max-
imum WTP for recovering the lifestyle and behavior they had before 
the crime. The question is: are these three measures of WTP really 
measuring different types of costs or are they measuring the WTP for 
reducing crime and violence in three different ways? The answer is 
not straightforward. The question is important if one wants to avoid 
a double counting problem. In what follows we will treat each CV 
question separately. However, the reader should be aware of the fact 
that all three WTP measurements could in fact be reflecting the same 
type of cost. Note again that non-victims were not asked any cost-
related question in the survey, and therefore, our results very likely 
underestimate the total value of non-monetary costs caused by crime 
in the city. 
5.2.2.1. Cost of Fear 
We approximate the cost of fear by using the amount of money that 
the victims would be willing to pay to avoid feeling fear. Besides their 
willingness to pay to avoid feeling fear, victims were asked whether 
they had suffered any psychological damage during or after the crime. 
59% of the victims answered yes to this question. As can be seen in 
figure 12, across quintiles the percentage of individuals who suffered 
psychological damage is higher than that of those who did not. 
Surprisingly, in the aggregate only 45% of the victims stated 
that they would be willing to pay something not to feel fear. The 
proportion of individuals unwilling to pay is higher than that of those 
willing to pay across all expenditure quintiles, as can be seen in figure 
13. We calculated the willingness to pay in terms of shares of the 
monthly expenditure by quintile. The results are depicted in figure 
14. 
The individuals in quintile 1 were willing to pay more than 50% 
of their monthly expenditure. Individuals in quintile 2 were willing 
to pay over 60% of their monthly expenditure. From quintile 3 to 
quintile 5 the share decreases as the monthly expenditure increases. 32  ESTUDIOS ECONÓMICOS 
Figure 12 
Did you suffer from phychological 
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Figure 14 
Cost of fear by quintile, in terms 
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5.2.2.2. Opportunity Costs of Not Increasing Public Safety Measures 
Individuals were asked about their willingness to pay to increase pub-
lic safety measures. We interpret the willingness to pay for such mea-
sures as the opportunity cost of not providing an efficient level of 
public safety measures. 
Only 28% of the victims were willing to pay for such measures. 
The percentage of victims not willing to pay is above 65% for all 




that public safety measures are paid by the general public through 
taxes and the possibility of paying even more for this matter can be 
considered unfair by the interviewed. This opposition to paying more 
than they are already paying can be expressed through answering that 
they are not willing to pay anything, thus biasing downwards their 
1
4
 "Protest zero" type answers to willingness to pay questions happen when 
individuals are against paying for something that they consider to be other's 
(such as the government's) obligation. They are a form of strategic bias of the 
true willingness to pay for the good or service. 34 ESTUDIOS ECONÓMICOS 
true valuation of an increase in public safety measures. Therefore, 
the results might underestimate the true willingness to pay for an 
increase in public safety measures. Figure 15 shows the percentage of 
persons who are and are not willing to pay for an increase in public 
safety measures by quintile. 
We calculated the shares of the willingness to pay for public se-
curity measures in terms of expenditure for each quintile. Figure 16 
above shows the distribution of these shares across quintiles. The 
shape of the average shares across quintiles has an inverted U-shape. 
Even if the percentage of individuals who are willing to pay is low 
for all quintiles, for quintiles 1 and 2 the opportunity cost of not in-
creasing public safety measures represents 50% and 63%, respectively, 
of their monthly expenditure. For individuals in quintiles 3 and 4 it 
represents almost 40% of their monthly outlay, and for those individ-
uals in quintile 5 the opportunity cost is equivalent to 12% of their 
monthly expenditure. 
Figure 15 
Would you be willing to pay to 
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Figure 16 
Average WTP to increase public safety by quintile, 
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5.2.2.3. Cost of Behavioral Changes After the Crime 
Individuals were asked if they had changed their lifestyle or behavior 
after the crime. In general, 40% of the victims changed their lifestyle 
after being victimized. Most of them (21%) began to avoid going out 
at night, 19% decided to carry less money with them, 14% stopped 
wearing jewelry, 10% began leaving their houses less frequently, 9% to 
dress less elegantly, 8% to avoid public transportation, 5% no longer 
go out for walks, 3% changed their working hours, and 3% decided 
not to use automatic cash-points machines anymore. 
These changes in behavior represent an intangible cost to society. 
This cost is that of not feeling free to behave as one would in non-
violent surroundings. In order to measure the magnitude of such a 
cost, the survey also asked the individuals about their willingness to 
pay to recover their previous lifestyle or behavior. Only 11.8% of 
the victims answered that they would be willing to pay something to 
recover their previous way of life. For all quintiles the percentage of 
individuals who are unwilling to pay exceeds 80% (see figure 17). 36 ESTUDIOS ECONÓMICOS 
Figure 17 
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Figure 18 
Cost of lifestyle or behavioral changes by quintile, 
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Figure 18 shows the distribution of the costs that changing their 
lifestyle or behavior represents to victims, in terms of proportions 
of their monthly expenditure. For individuals in quintile 2 who ex-
pressed a willingness to pay, changing their behavior represented a 
cost that is equivalent to 127% of their monthly expenditure. Indi-
viduals in other quintiles have lower shares. 
5.3. Value of Property Transfers 
Property transfers refer to the monetary amount of property that 
was stolen through robbery or larceny. These transfers will not be 
considered in estimating the social costs of crime, for they do not 
represent lost property but property transferred from one individual 
to another, even though the means of the transfer was illegal. 
The survey data show that 91% of the victims suffered material 
losses of an average value of $7,116 pesos (US$757). By quintile the 
percentage of victims who lost property does not vary significantly. 
The most frequent losses were money (69%), personal possessions 
(10%), car (8.7%), jewels (6.5%), electric or electronic equipment 
(4.3%), and food (1.5%). 
When calculating the share that the value of the transfers repre-
sent for each expenditure quintile, we find that individuals in quintile 
1 lost over 1500% of their monthly expenditure (see figure 19). The 
share decreases as expenditure level increases until quintile 4, and 
then rises again in quintile 5, where the value of these losses repre-
sented, on average, 1500% of their monthly expenditure. 
5.4. Putting Costs Together 
5.4.1. Monetary Costs 
Figure 20 depicts the distribution of the shares that the monetary 
costs of crime represent for individuals in terms of their monthly ex-
penditure. For individuals in quintile 1 the major cost by far is that of 
the medical expenses, equivalent to more than 7 times their monthly 
per capita expenditure. Medical expenses also represent a high share 
for quintile 2 (over 350% of their monthly per capita expenditure) 
but are slightly surpassed by the costs of legal procedures. The latter 
represents the highest share for individuals in quintiles 3 and 4. The 
costs of safety measures are higher for those individuals in quintiles 
1, 2 and 3 than for those in quintiles 4 and 5. The costs of the days 38 ESTUDIOS ECONÓMICOS 
Figure 19 
Value of tranfers as share of 
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lost either to medical care or to legal procedures represent the lowest 
shares for all quintiles. 
Figure 21 aggregates the shares of all monetary costs by quin-
tile. The result is astonishing in terms of the inequitable distribution 
of the shares across quintiles. After being victimized individuals in 
quintile 1 end up paying a sum equivalent to 1187% of their monthly 
expenditure, while for individuals in quintile 5 this sum represents 
356% of their monthly expenditure. 
Figure 21 
Total monetary costs of victimization by 
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As figure 21 shows, the proportion of monthly expenditure repre-
sented by the total costs of crime decreases as expenditure increases. 
The impact of crime in terms of monetary social costs is therefore 
much higher for the poor than for the rich in Mexico City, in general 
terms. 
5.4.2. Non-Monetary Costs 
Figure 22 shows the distribution of non-monetary costs (those mea-
sured through willingness to pay) for individuals in terms of their 40 ESTUDIOS ECONÓMICOS 
monthly expenditure. The proportion of all non-monetary costs with 
respect to monthly expenditure is much smaller than that of any of 
the monetary costs, with the exception of the costs of lost days. The 
cost of fear is higher than other non-monetary costs for individuals in 
quintiles 1, 2, 3 and 5. The willingness to pay for an increase in public 
safety measures (or the opportunity cost of not increasing these) is 
higher for individuals in quintile 2 than for all other individuals and 
almost equal to the willingness to pay to recover the previous lifestyle 
in all quintiles. 
Figure 22 
Non-monetary costs of victimization by 
quintile, in terms of expenditure shares 
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The distribution of non-monetary costs still favors individuals 
in quintiles 3, 4 and 5. The highest impact of all non-monetary costs 
falls on individuals in quintile 2. It should be remembered that these 
three measures of apparently different non-monetary costs might in 
fact be measuring the same. If this were the case, figure 22 would 
allow comparison of the different measurements of the monetary value 
that society attaches to reductions in crime and violence that can be 
obtained under three different types of CV questions. THE SOCIAL COSTS OF CRIME IN MEXICO 41 
5.5. Social Costs of Victimization: Are They Big? 
If the WBF survey is representative for Mexico City and its sub-
urbs, we can extrapolate the survey's results to the population of 
the metropolitan area. In 1999 the population of the metropolitan 
area was 18,202,000 (Mexico City had 8.6 million inhabitants and 
the suburban areas 9.6 million). If while collecting the survey 993 
individuals out of 2,605 answered that they were victims of crime in 
the past six months, then the victimization rate is 38%. Assuming 
this estimate is representative of the population in Mexico City and 
its suburban areas, the number of victims in the metropolitan area 
reaches 6,916,760. Table 4 shows the total costs of victimization for 
the 993 victims in the survey, the total costs of victimization in the 
metropolitan area and the percentage that these costs represent in 
terms of Mexico City GDP in 1998. The reader should remember that 
these costs are those borne only by the victims. The highest propor-
tion corresponds to that of the medical care the victims receive: out 
of pocket expenditure in medical care and the cost of the public care 
together add up to 1.6% of the City's 1998 GDP. 
When the cost of lives lost to homicides and the governmental 
expenditure on crime prevention, prosecution, and justice are taken 
into account, the total social costs of crime in the metropolitan area of 
Mexico City in 1999 amount to 3.61% of the City's 1998 GDP. When 
property transfers are taken into account, the total cost of crime and 
violence reaches 8.1% of the City's GDP. 
6. Conclusions 
This paper is a first attempt to measure and compare the costs of 
homicides under three different alternatives. Two of them -consi-
dering only the number of years lost to homicides and assuming a 
constant wage over the life cycle- have been used in previous studies. 
Given that both of these methodologies severely underestimate the 
costs of homicides, we propose a third alternative for measuring costs: 
taking into consideration differences in wage profiles. The highest 
costs are obtained under this new approach, that is when taking into 
consideration that the wages of the deceased individuals would have 
grown over time for young people and decreased for older ones. Under 
this approach the social costs of crime attributed to losses of lives due 
to homicide in 1997 amounts to between .03 and .6 percent of Mexican 
GDP, depending on the assumptions about the discount factor. 42 ESTUDIOS ECONÓMICOS 
Regarding other types of crime, we found that the social costs of 
crime and crime prevention in Mexico City in 1999 approximate 3.6 
percent of the City's GDP in 1998. It should be noted that in this 
calculation we did not take into account the expenditure of private 
firms on private security, other victimization costs, such as family 
violence, nor the monetary and non-monetary costs borne by non-
victims of crime. Therefore, the figure most likely underestimates 
the true cost of crime and violence, and further data, including the 
collection of victimization surveys that take into account the costs 
borne by non-victims, would be most helpful for further research in 
this field. 
It is interesting to note the relatively high weight that medical 
expenses represent in the total victimization costs. For the poorer 
individuals out of pocket expenditure in health care is by far the 
major cost that they have to face, for it is equivalent to more than 7 
times their monthly per capita expenditure. 
When we aggregate costs for each quintile, we find that the pro-
portion of the monthly expenditure that the total costs of crime rep-
resent decreases as monthly expenditure increases. The impact of 
crime in terms of monetary social costs is therefore much higher for 
the poor than for the rich in Mexico City. 
Regarding non-monetary costs, three measures of willingness to 
pay were considered. Regardless of which one of the three should 
be considered as the true measure of the cost of crime and violence, 
the distribution of the shares that these costs represent in terms of 
monthly expenditure still favors individuals in quintiles 3, 4 and 5. 
In Mexico City, policies aimed at reducing the cost that crime 
imposes on society should therefore focus on the poor. Moreover, if, 
as according to the literature, one of the causes of crime is an unequal 
income distribution, and, as we find out in this paper, crime tends to 
widen the gap between the poor and the rich, a vicious cycle might 
be avoided by focusing on the individuals who are the most affected 
by crime and violence. 
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